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1. Suppression of the Atlantic slave trade: Abolition from ship to shore 
Robert Burroughs 
 
This study provides fresh perspectives on criticalaspects of the British Royal Navy’s 
suppression of the Atlantic slave trade. It is divided into three sections. The first, Policies, 
presents a new interpretation of the political framework underwhich slave-trade suppression 
was executed. Section II, Practices, examines details of the work of the navy’s West African 
Squadronwhich have been passed over in earlier narrativeaccounts. Section III, 
Representations, provides the first sustained discussion of the squadron’s wider, cultural 
significance, and its role in the shaping of geographical knowledge of West Africa.One of our 
objectives in looking across these three areas—a view from shore to ship and back again--is 
to understand better how they overlap. Our authors study the interconnections between 
political and legal decision-making, practical implementation, and cultural production and 
reception in an anti-slavery pursuit undertaken far from the metropolitan centres in which it 
was first conceived.Such an approachpromises new insights into what the anti-slave-trade 
patrols meant to Britain and what the campaign of ‘liberation’ meant for those enslaved 
Africans andnavalpersonnel, including black sailors, whose lives were most closely entangled 
in it. 
The following chapters reassess the policies, practices, and representations of slave-
trade suppression by building upon developments in research in political, legal and 
humanitarian history, naval, imperial and maritime history, medical history, race relations 
and migration, abolitionist literature and art, nineteenth-century geography, nautical literature 
and art, and representations of Africa. Topics that this book encompass are accordingly 
varied, and include: the origins and implementation of the suppression policy; the rise of 
‘anti-coercionist’ challenges to naval deployment in West Africa in the mid-nineteenth-
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century, and the failure of those challenges; responses to Britain’s abolitionist policy from 
outside of Britain; Britain’s imperial belligerence in enforcing the anti-slave-trade patrols; 
emotional responses of officers and sailors to this task; race-relations in the West African 
squadron; health histories;  the transition of liberated Africans into apprenticeship in the 
colonies; images of officers, sailors, slaves, and slave traders in representations of slave-trade 
suppression; and the impact of this endeavour upon British perceptions of West Africa. 
A scholarly reassessment of the long-running coercive crusade against the trafficking 
of enslaved Africans to the Americas is overdue. In the years since Eric Williams’s 
Capitalism and Slavery (1944) fundamentally challenged self-satisfied and complacent 
histories of Britain’s anti-slavery movement, and ignited scholarly inquiry into the slave trade 
and slavery in the Atlantic world, slave-trade suppression has been valuably examined in 
several studies.1These works mainly focus upon the economic and political shaping of all or 
certain parts of the Atlantic world, often with particular attention to questions of international 
diplomacy and law.2 Discussions by maritime and slave-tradehistorians, centred on the 
policies and practices of arresting the commerce, have hitherto tended to fall back on 
accounts by the naval historians Christopher Lloyd (1949) and W.E.F Ward (1969),3while the 
cultural significance of slave-trade suppression in nineteenth-century Britain has received 
little attention despite the increase in studies of this dimension ofslavery and 
abolition.4Lloyd’s and Ward’s accounts contain much useful anecdotal information, and both 
are particularly strong in detailing the suffering of naval crews chasing ‘slavers’ in West 
Africa. However, both are written in admiring tones which assume humanitarian motives for 
naval suppression as much as they presume patriotic pride on behalf of the reader. They 
encourage the understanding of slave-trade suppression as an end-point, a self-satisfied 
conclusion, in triumphalist narratives of Britain’s emergence as a leading anti-slavery nation. 
As many commentators note, official and popular commentaries on British history 
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traditionally linger on the presumed beneficence of abolition of slave trading and/or slavery, 
rather than other parts of that history such as Britons’ leading role in trafficking and 
exploitation.This was notoriously the case with many of the events in 2007 that marked the 
bicentennial commemorations of the Abolition Act. Slave-trade suppression featured then 
primarily in specialist (military) events whichat times echoed the laudatory tone of the 
historical sources that they drew upon.Richard Huzzey and John MacAleer explore these 
recent representations in the Ch. 8 this volume. 
Another by-product of the 2007 remembrances,Siân Rees’s history of slave-trade 
suppression,Sweet Water and Bitter: The Ships that Stopped the Slave Trade (2008), 
significantly improves upon its forebears by retelling the rich anecdotal history of the West 
African Squadron in newly clear, chronological form. Rees makes particularly good use of 
the Sierra Leone Gazette in shedding new light on the early years of the pursuit, and pays 
much-required attention to African perspectives and life-stories. Even so, Rees at times 
repeats Lloyd’s and Ward’s moralistic interpretation of events in which support for and 
service in the squadron is interpreted as an innate response to the violence of slavery, or an 
act of personal or national atonement.5By reassessing the policies, practices, and 
representations of slave-trade suppression, our contributors seek to address the thornier 
questions raised by a campaign apparently founded on national atonement and altruism in an 
age of empire and aggrandisement, on vast financial and military commitment in an age of 
colonial retrenchment, and on the universalist rhetoric of the anti-slavery movement in an age 
of nationalism and competing views on racial difference.The remainder of this chapter offers 
supporting information on the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century and the efforts of 
the navy to eliminate it, and introduces the following chapters. Along the way I explain 
further our objectives for this volume by comparing our concerns and emphases to those of 
previous histories of slave-trade suppression. 
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The Atlantic slave trade entered a new and uncertain phase after the British Government 
passed the Abolition Act (1807) to outlaw British participation in the industry as of January 
1808. The act led to a sharp decrease in the volume of slave trading, as only a small number 
of British merchants and captains continued illicitly in the trade, running the risk of 
confiscation of their ship and a fine of £100 for every slave found in their possession. 
Domestic laws were reinforced to extinguish the embers of the British traffic. From 1811 
Britons’ slave trading was punishable by 14 years’ transportation; three years later Britons’ 
lending of capital to non-British slave merchants was prohibited. These laws brought a swift 
end to British merchants’ open participation in the slave trade.Yet the traffic persisted, and 
rapidly regenerated,as slave traders from throughout the Atlantic worldfilled the vacuum 
created by British withdrawal byoperating under the colours of other nations that had yet to 
enforce meaningful anti-slave-trade laws. By the 1820s, the volume of Atlantic slave-trading 
was nearly as great as it had been in its all-time peak decades, the 1780s and 1790s.6Illegality 
makes it harder to find written records, but British support for and involvement in the slave 
trade probably also recovered over time as merchants sought loopholes and conspiracies to 
continue profiting.7 
 The decline in British slave-dealing was nonetheless momentous because of the scale 
of the nation’s participation in the trade prior to 1808. According to the important research of 
the ‘Transatlantic Slave Trade Voyages’ project, an estimated 12.5 million enslaved Africans 
were entered into the Atlantic slave traffic. (Of those embarked, approximately 10.7 million 
arrived in the Americas. Most of the remaining 1.8 million persons were killed at sea.8) More 
than a quarter of the total number travelled on English or British ships. Portugal was the most 
active slave-trading nation over the long history of the slave trade, but David Eltis and David 
Richardson calculate that Britons dominated the slave trade in eight of the thirteen decades 
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between 1681 and 1807. The peak years of British slave trading were those immediately prior 
to the Abolition Act. In the 1780s and 1790s, Britons tookaway roughly 45% of all enslaved 
Africans bound for the Americas.9 
As it became apparent that the trade would continue in the hands of other nations, the 
British government set about enforcing abolition by means of what Serge Daget describes as 
a ‘supranational policy’  of legal and diplomatic pressure, naval patrolling, and confiscation 
of slave ships and their human cargoes at courts of mixed commission.10 While Britain 
remained at war, its navy seized slave ships sailing under the flags of its enemies France, 
Holland and Spain, taking their human cargoes as contraband, as it had done throughout the 
Napoleonic Wars in accordance with wartime belligerent rights. Despite not possessing the 
legal authority, the navy also detained slave ships sailing under the U.S. and Danish flags on 
the premise that it acted on behalf of these nations, which had illegalised the trade. After the 
Strangford Treaty of 1810, which outlawed Portuguese slave-trading outside of its own 
dominions and fixed import taxes on British goods entering Brazil, Portuguese (including 
Brazilian) ships also were intercepted unless they could prove that they were travelling 
between Portuguese ports. There is little question that during the war the navy operated on 
the fringes of, and sometimes outside, international law.11 
Almost immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, the seizure of the French ship Louis 
by HMS Queen Charlotte caused a legal controversy that tested and defeated Britain’s right 
to search suspected (and actual) slave traders. It then became imperative that government 
officials (in particular the Foreign Secretaries Castlereagh and Canning) and abolitionist 
leaders intensify their campaign ‘to coax or coerce’ the other maritime powers in the Atlantic, 
plus the slave-trading states of Africa, to sign anti-slave-trade treaties with Britain, impose 
their own abolition laws, establish their own anti-slave-trade squadrons, participate in courts 
of mixed commission, and grant the British navy rights to help enforce their legislation.12 By 
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1819, the navy had installed a permanent squadron off the west coast of Africa. It would 
remain in place until 1870. At its peak in the mid- to late-1840s, Britain’s West African 
squadron annually comprised in excess of 36 vessels and 4,000 personnel. These figures 
represent roughly 15% of warships then in commission, and one tenth of the naval 
workforce.13 
Statistics only tell us so much about the extent of the British government’s 
commitment to these patrols. Lord Palmerston’s famous comment that ‘[i]f there was a 
particularly old slow-going tub in the Navy she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to 
try and catch the fast sailing American clippers’ needs to be read in context as a hyperbolic 
complaint to Russell about the Admiralty’s frustration of his plans.14 Naval historians have 
nevertheless agreed that the navy was for the most part ill-provisioned to perform its task. In 
most years, the squadron that patrolled the West African coast was too small, and its ships too 
old or low-rating, to offer a major threat to illegal slave trading. And yet the military 
inadequacy of the force does not negate the surprising cost and commitment to suppression 
throughout a period of fiscal retrenchment.15 In the first section of this book, Richard Huzzey 
traces the political debates which framed legal and diplomatic policies for the British state’s 
waning but unbroken commitment to slave-trade suppression. He considers the popularity of 
this campaign and assesses the motives of subsequent generations of politicians who 
maintained, and occasionally challenged, the anti-slave-trade patrols. 
One of the main aims of this volume is to come to a more nuanced understanding of 
the motivations behind Britain’s anti-slave-trade policies and actions. This entails studying 
the work of slave-trade suppression with awareness of its political motivations and 
repercussions, its practical difficulties and the impact of these on enslaved peoples, former 
slaves, and naval sailors, and the broader cultural and ideological framework of the political 
and practical considerations of the campaign. Far from discounting morality as a motivating 
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factor, we seek to examine how moral motives might figure in this context. Lloyd’s view that 
the squadron was launched out of ‘purely philanthropic motives’ understates the complexity 
and the momentousness of Britain’s transition from leading poacher to gamekeeper of the 
slave trade, for the nation as a whole (or at least its vocal minority), and for the navy as an 
institution.16 Prior to 1807, the navy had looked favourably upon the slave trade as a 
‘nursery’ for seamen helping to preserve naval supremacy, especially at times of war. Naval 
members of the House of Commons voted against abolition,17 Nelson famously spoke out 
against Wilberforce, while naval commanders turned a blind eye to the illegal trade between 
the West Indies and the USA.Most naval protection of the British slave trade had of course 
been undertaken in the straightforward preservation of the nation’s mercantile trade. Even the 
last British ships legally to carry slaves from Africa did so, in October 1807, under escort of a 
naval frigate to guard against attacks by enemy navies.18 Points such as this remind us that 
the African Squadron was the product of an unlikely union between the navy and the anti-
slavery society, two institutions with different conceptualisations of freedom. Many of its 
policies and practices bear the mark of this ambiguity, as do representations of them. 
To understand morality as one contingent and conditional factor among several 
others, including less savoury incentives such as prize monies, is to treat the human agents of 
Britain’s anti-slave-trade initiatives as three-dimensional beings acting in a moment of 
complicated historical change. If at times the humans seem less than humane, then they seem 
no less human for it. Indeed, the moralistic interpretation of events tends to represent naval 
personnel assigned to anti-slave-trade policing as unreflexive, and, in more ways than 
one,self-less agents of imperial power founded on humanitarian convictions. Rees, for 
example, characterises sailors in this context as guided by an unconscious humanitarianism--
‘inflexibly xenophobic, unthinkingly racist yet dying in their thousands to save individuals 
with whom they had nothing in common but humanity.’19 While the debate continues as to 
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the severity of conditions of service in the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century navy, it is 
unsafe to assume that sailors did or did not recognise shared humanity with enslaved 
Africans. Life at sea might have desensitised sailors to this point.20Alongside Rees’s 
interpretation we might place the fictional tars (including press-gang victims) in Captain 
Marryat’s Peter Simple (1834), who, when petitioned to donate wages to the anti-slavery 
movement by a West Indian missionary, curtly reply, ‘[t]he nigger’s better off [than] we’.21 
Domestic debates and calculations such as the sailor’s rights movement were framed 
by the international context of suppression. The British forces were joined sporadically by 
squadrons from the navies of France, Portugal, and the USA—although only during the brief 
Paine-Tucker accord of 1840 did any of these squadrons (those of Britain and the USA) work 
co-dependently with one another.22 The Royal Navy’s campaigns generated more hostility 
than amity with foreign nations. Most of the Atlantic powers were unwilling or unable to 
enforce meaningful measures against their merchants’ trade in slaves. They had not 
experienced the same levels of abolitionist sentiment as had Britain, their navies were weaker 
than Britain’s, in part because of war, and so too were their economies more dependent on 
slavery. The resistance of other governments to Britain’s campaign posed an insurmountable 
difficulty for ships on the anti-slave-trade patrols: as long as one nation refused to enter into 
effectual bilateral agreements with Britain, slave traders could continue to operate by raising 
that nation’s flag if approached by naval patrollers. If boarded, they could show forged 
documentation of the ship’s place of origin. Slave-ship captains travelled with more than one 
set of papers and flags, and evaded capture by employing these appropriately according to 
geographical location and current legislation. As foreign ministers worked to close the 
loopholes, anti-slave-trade officers were charged with navigating a labyrinthine, and ever-
shifting, network of treaties. For naval captains this meant continuing economic risk in 
capturing slave ships. They were forced to weigh the pecuniary incentives of seizing slave-
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ship prizes against the threat of personal liability for the compensation of merchants who 
could prove--legitimately or otherwise--that their ship had been illegally condemned. 
Taking into consideration the various practical problems of naval suppression, in her 
chapter in Section II of this volume Mary Wills considers the responses of officers serving on 
the squadron, exploring how far faith, profits and honour shaped their responses to the 
assignment. Much of the disquiet among sailors and the Admiralty came from the fearful 
mortality rates on British naval vessels assigned to West Africa. The morale-sapping effects 
of death--be it in the infrequent but fierce battles against slave-ship crews, or, as was more 
likely, through infection by tropical diseases--profoundly determined naval sailors’ attitudes 
to the squadron.John Rankin’s chapter in Section IIfurther delineates the health of sailors of 
European and African descent, finding that the latter were deemed more suited to the 
unhealthy climate and consequently given more unenviable tasks and more aggressive 
medical treatments.Although they are frequently overlooked in previous historical studies, 
black seamen were thus crucial to the day-to-day practices of slave-trade suppression. 
Given the costs for Britain in blood and coin, it is hardly surprising that some of the 
sailors who worked in it, as well as the taxpayers who financed it, viewed the campaign 
uncharitably. While many commentators of the nineteenth century saw in it cause for benign 
celebration of British far-sightedness, others questioned its effectiveness. As several 
contemporary observers noted, as long as it could not stop the trade, the navy may have 
exacerbated the suffering of the enslaved on Atlantic crossings by forcing the once legitimate 
trade into the hands of individuals who adopted ever more mercenary and hazardous tactics to 
ship the largest possible quantities of Africans to the Americas. This realisation raised 
questions about the valueof suppression as a moral act which are not straightforwardly settled 
by pointing to the squadron’s successes.  Those periods in which the navy appeared to be 
making the greatest in-roads by capturing large numbers of slave traders, thanks in part to 
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changes in treaty obligations and naval strategies, for example, often reflect proportionate 
increases in slave-trading activity. As Eltis notes, while the squadron may have checked the 
growth of the slave trade, only when the British government imposed its self-perceived moral 
authority upon the governments of other nations, in particular Portugal and Brazil, could it 
effect change in regions and markets beyond its formal control.23 Aside from British insults 
to the sovereignty of Portugal and Brazil, recent research by Robin Law suggests that anti-
slave-trade agreements made in West Africa laid the groundwork for British presumption and 
colonial expansion by discriminating against the sovereignrights of ‘uncivilised’ peoples.24 
Even then the navy could not fully stop the supply so long as demand for slaves and legal 
protection for slave traders existed in the Americas.25 
And yet in spite of the various complications, between 1808 and 1867 the navy 
intercepted more than 1,600 slave ships carrying approximately 160,000 slaves bound for the 
Americas.26 Naval suppression further proved a deterrent to the trade by increasing costs and 
risks. In most likely curbing the growth of the industry, it effectively prevented hundreds of 
thousands of Africans’ undergoing the trauma of the Atlantic crossing and enslavement in the 
Americas.27 This is not necessarily to say that these same Africans won freedom thanks to the 
work of the West African Squadron. The liberty afforded to the individuals who entered as 
apprentices into the fledging colonial society of Sierra Leone or were shipped as ‘free 
emigrants’ to the West Indies cannot be clearly distinguished from the bonded labour 
awaiting them had their enslavers completed the voyage to the Americas. As Emma 
Christopher shows in Ch. 4 of this volume, the British authorities showed contempt for the 
abilities and liberties of those individuals it tellingly labelled as ‘recaptives’ and ‘freed 
slaves’. Christopher centres her enquiry on early records from Freetown, Sierra Leone, the 
hub of anti-slave-trade activity. 
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J. R. Oldfield comments that one of the most striking aspects of the history of Atlantic 
slavery ‘is its silencing of African perspectives, and, in particular, the suffering of the 
millions who were sold into slavery.’28 Histories of slave-trade suppression tend to bear out 
this observation. Another main aim of this volume is to highlight the impact of anti-slave-
trade measures upon enslaved and formerly enslaved Africans, and the lack of attention to 
African perspectives in earlier (including contemporaneous) writings about the subject. As 
noted before, the books by Lloyd and Ward not only prioritise white perspectives but also 
white suffering on the preventive patrols,though Rees’s book already has done much valuable 
work in drawing upon West African historiography to fill in the noticeable gap in African 
experiences.29 New research in this volume on the handling of ‘recaptives’ in Sierra Leone, 
and the medical treatment of blacks on naval vessels, adds to our understanding of the 
African experience of anti-slave-trade patrols. In particular, this research makes clear that the 
lack of African perspectives consulted in contemporary discussions, and in subsequent 
histories and memorialisation of the West African Squadron, should not be assumed to denote 
a lack of agency on the part of enslaved peoples, or other Africans involved in suppression. 
Just as historians have recovered histories of resistance to the slave trade and slavery, so one 
of the most pressing tasks for researchers of slave-trade suppression is to recall the variety of 
black experiences of and roles in it and the trade it sought to curb.30 
The experiences of sailors and Africans ashore and on ship often stand in contrast to 
contemporaneous representations of naval suppression. Robert Burroughs considers the 
ambiguities of British writers’ representations of the West African Squadron in his part of 
section III. As with political debate, literary representations contested the meanings of the 
campaign, and ideas and impressions about the slave trade, its victims, perpetrators and 
prosecutors further informed the ways Britons imagined themselves in relation to other 
peoples and places. Perhaps above all other territories, this is the case with West Africa. 
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Eltiswrites that ‘[d]espite occasional redeployment of cruisers from West Africa to Brazil and 
the Caribbean, the centre of suppression was always on the west coast of Africa.’ More than 
85% of all slave-ship captures took place there.31 On top of the legal and diplomatic 
implications of suppression policies for the future of British imperialism in Africa, the naval 
campaigns played an important part in framing images of the continent and, in particular, its 
west coast. In his chapter for section III David Lambert examines how the suppression 
campaign forged geographical knowledge and expert prejudices in the metropole. 
As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, a further aim of this volume is to identify 
the cross-fertilisation of ideas and understandings of the anti-slave-trade squadron among its 
metropolitan architects, critics, and other interested parties, and those who experienced it at 
the coal-face. Generally speaking, Lloyd understands this flow of information to be one-way: 
from ship to shore. As naval captains witnessed horrors of the slave trade, they were 
converted to the anti-slavery cause, supplying the evidence that persuaded far-seeing 
politicians such as Russell to push home the measures required to eliminate the trade. In 
contrast, Williams and his followers focus on the flow of information from shore to ship: 
economic and political considerations in the metropolitan centres of empire forced the 
government’s hand in pursuing its anti-slave-trade agenda, no matter the various hardships it 
inflicted upon sailors, recaptives, and enslaved Africans. Taken together, the following 
chapters identify a complex, transformative negotiation of knowledge and understanding of 
the African Squadron, one in which the ship, and the maritime world more broadly, is found 
to help shape, and not just passively reflect, the cultural, political and other spheres of 
nineteenth-century Britain. One of the main examples of this is the literal dis-illusionment 
that takes place as naval personnel contemplatedphilanthropic ideals amid the complicated 
reality of patrolling the African coast. While working to suppress the subsidiary trade in the 
southern Indian Ocean of slaves bound for the Americas, for example, Lt. F.L. Barnard 
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criticised ‘Englishmen, who annihilate the slave-dealers and civilize Africa by their own 
comfortable firesides, little thinking of the hardships and privations their countrymen are 
undergoing to carry out their impossible theories.’32 Although the straightforwardness of this 
view from the fireside is upheld in the writings of some eyewitnesses, sobering appraisals 
such as Barnard’s would also feed back into metropolitan discussions, changing home-grown 
expectations and priorities in the process. This understanding of the ship and its environs as 
units of cultural exchange that inform ‘the centre’ has the effect, advised by Paul Gilroy, of 
challenging ‘the unthinking assumption that cultures always flow into patterns congruent 
with the borders of essentially homogeneous nation states’.33 
The image of slave-trade suppression has changed not only in different spheres but 
also over time. Our final chapter considers how the nineteenth-century suppression of the 
slave trade has survived in British public memory, tracing early commemorations through to 
the museums and political debates of our own times. Huzzey and John McAleer examine how 
those with divergent agendas have appropriated the history of suppression to recover different 
uses of the past for the present. 
 
The British navy’s campaign to suppress the Atlantic slave trade ran for more than half a 
century, and in that time it directly impacted upon several nations and peoples of Africa, 
Europe, and the Americas. It is a history of hemispheric proportions. Far from attempting 
comprehensive coverage, the present study works toward the objectives that I have outlined 
above through detailed discussion of particular issues, regions, and time-frames. We have 
focused almost exclusively on British naval operations, and much of our discussion is centred 
on activities in and around the West African coast, which was the centre-ground of 
preventive action. Further research may profitably look at the anti-slave-trade squadrons 
despatched by the navies of other nations, both in terms of their direct engagements with the 
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slave trade and in their interrelationship with the dominant, British presence, and at the work 
of other British squadrons beyond West Africa.34In view of the danger of ‘maritimization’ of 
the history of transatlantic slavery, which in truth stemmed from and shapedindustrial centres 
far removed from the ports of the Atlantic world, researchers need also to trace deeper-lying 
metropolitan connections to the post-1808traffic.35This is not to mention the ‘many middle 
passages’ and other anti-slave-trade activities beyond the Atlantic world, including (but not 
limited to) the campaigns against the Indian-ocean slave trade, the Swahili-Arab slave traffic 
across the Sahara to North Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and India, and the trafficking of 
indentured labourers from the Pacific Islands to Queensland, Australia.36The subject is 
practically inexhaustible, and doubtless future studies of anti-slave-trade operations at 
different historical junctures and geographical loci—the many ships, ports and courts that 
comprise this history—will complicate as well as corroborate the arguments advanced here. 
We submit this collaborative venture as a new history of slave-trade suppression, not the final 
one, and a collective intervention in animportant episode in the histories of slavery, empire, 
and nineteenth-century Britain. 
 
Notes 
                                                            
1 ‘The unwearied, unostentatious, and inglorious crusade of England against slavery may 
probably be regarded as among the three or four perfectly virtuous acts recorded in the 
history of nations’, wrote the historian W.H. Lecky. Qtd. in Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and 
the Slave Trade [1949] (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. xiii.See Eric Williams, Capitalism 
and Slavery [1944](London: André Deutsch), 1964. 
2 Important studies include LeslieBethell, ‘The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of 
the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African Historical 
Studies 7 (1966), 79-93; Johnson U.J.Asiegbu, Slavery and the Politics of Liberation, 1787-
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1861: A Study of Liberated African Emigration and British Anti-Slavery Policy(London: 
Longmans, 1969). Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the 
Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); David R. 
Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain, and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave 
Trade(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); DavidEltis, Economic Growth and 
the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Robin 
Law(ed.), From Slave Trade to ‘Legitimate Commerce’: The Commercial Transition in 
Nineteenth-Century West Africa(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Paul 
MichaelKielstra, The Politics of Slave Trade Suppression in Britain and France, 1814-
48(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Joseph C. Dorsey, Slave Traffic in the Age of 
Abolition: Puerto Rico, West Africa, and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean, 1815-59(Gainesville, 
FL: University Press of Florida, 2003);Holger Lutz Kern, ‘Strategies of Legal Change: Great 
Britain, International Law, and the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade’,Journal of the 
History of International Law 6 (2004), 233-58. Wayne Ackerson,The African Institution 
(1807-1827) and the Antislavery Movement in Great Britain(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2005); Jean Allain, ‘Nineteenth-Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of 
the Slave Trade’, British Yearbook of International Law, 78 (2008), 342-88; Mark C. 
Hunter,Policing the Seas: Anglo-American Relations and the Equatorial Atlantic, 1819-1865 
(St. John’s, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2008); 
Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (eds), Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire: Britain and the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1807-1915(Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009). For 
further references see Peter C. Hogg, The African Slave Trade and Its Suppression: A 
Classified and Annotated Bibliography (Frank Cass: Abingdon, 1973). 
3 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade;W.E.F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers(London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1969).Among histories of the slave trade, see for example Daniel 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
P. Mannix and Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
[1962](London: Longmans, 1963), pp. 191-265; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The 
History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870(London: Picador, 1997), pp. 559-785. Among 
naval historians, see Anthony Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat: The Victorian Navy 
and Supremacy at Sea, 1854-1904 [1967](London: Conway, 2007), pp. 91-97; Peter Padfield, 
Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy [1981](London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 109-
25. 
4 The fullest discussions are in Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and 
Actions, 1780-1850(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 318, 341;David 
Turley,The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 47. 
5In accounting for Lt. Joseph Denman’s aggressive assault on slave-holders of the Gallinas 
River, for example, Rees’s comment that this naval officer ‘had already served on the African 
coast as lieutenant and been converted to active abolitionism by the horrors he had seen 
there’, echoes Lloyd’s assertion that ‘[s]uch an initiation into the horrors of the trade bit deep 
into the young man’s mind… The ruthless methods he subsequently adopted clearly owe 
their origin to that experience’. Siân Rees, Sweet Water and Bitter: The Ships that Stopped 
the Slave Trade(London: Chatto and Windus, 2008), p. 202; Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave 
Trade, p. 93. I pursue representations of this kind in Ch. 6 of this study. 
6David Eltis and David Richardson, ‘A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Slave Trade’, in 
Eltis and Richardson (eds), Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave 
Trade Database(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 1-60, at pp. 40-41, Table 
1.6. 
7 For speculation on continuing British capitalist complicity, see Marika Sherwood, After 
Abolition: Britain and the Slave Trade Since 1807(London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). Richard 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Huzzey discusses the stubborn problem of Britons’ indirect benefitting from the slave trade in 
his chapter for this volume. 
8 Eltis and Richardson, ‘New Assessment’, pp. 37, 45 
9 Eltis and Richardson, ‘New Assessment’, p. 39; ‘Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade 
Voyages Database’, Emory University,www.slavevoyages.org. Accessed 29 December 2013. 
10 SergeDaget, ‘France, Suppression of the Illegal Trade, and England, 1817-1850’, in David 
Eltis and James Walvin (eds), The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects 
in Europe, Africa, and the Americas(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), pp. 
193-217, at p. 202 
11 Eltis, Economic Growth, pp. 104-5; Allain, ‘Nineteenth-Century Law’. 
12 Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, p. x 
13 Eltis, Economic Growth, p. 92 (table 2), p. 94. In Ch. 2 of this book Richard Huzzey 
considers national expenditure on the squadron. 
14 Qtd. in Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 1970, p. 124. 
15 Examining the campaign as humanitarian intervention, the social scientists Kaufman and 
Papenominate it as, in relative terms, the costliest moral action in modern history.Chaim D. 
Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, ‘Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's 
Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade’, International Organization, 53 
(1999), 631-68. 
16 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, p. xiii. 
17 Ralph A. Austen and Woodruff D. Smith, ‘Images of African and British Slave-Trade 
Abolition: The Transition to an Imperialist Ideology, 1787-1807’, African Historical Studies, 
2 (1969), 69-83, at p. 74. 
18 Rees, Salt Water and Bitter, p. 8. 
19 Rees, Salt Water and Bitter, p. 6. 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
20 On shipboard interrelations in the eighteenth-century slave trade, see Emma Christopher, 
Slave Ship Sailors and Their Captive Cargoes, 1730-1807(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
21 Captain Frederick Marryat, Peter Simple[1834], 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1904), i: 69. 
The Marryat family were compensated for the emancipation of slaves in the British West 
Indies. See Catherine Hall et al’s ‘Legacies of British Slave-Ownership’ database, UCL,  
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/. Accessed 20 February 2014. 
22 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, pp. 53-54. 
23 Eltis, Economic Growth, pp. 102-122. See also Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave 
Trade. 
24 Robin Law, ‘Abolition and Imperialism: International Law and the British Suppression of 
the Atlantic Slave Trade’, in Derek Peterson (ed.), Abolition and Imperialism in Britain, 
Africa, and the Atlantic(Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010), pp. 150-74. 
25 Eltis, Economic Growth, p. 219. 
26 E.P. LeVeen, British Slave Trade Suppression Policies, 1821-1868. New York: Arno, 
1977, p. 78 (table 11). 
27 LeVeen calculates that 660,000 Africans were spared the Atlantic crossing because of the 
anti-slave-trade patrols.British Slave Trade Suppression Policies, p. 60. But see also 
LeVeen’s evaluation of this figure onpp. 58-60. Eltisgives the figure of 213,000 for the 
period after 1830 in‘Volume and Structure’, p. 43, Table 7. 
28 J. R. Oldfield, ‘Chords of Freedom’: Commemoration, Ritual and British Transatlantic 
Slavery (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 2 
29 On the propensity of white writers about Atlantic slavery to appropriate suffering in the 
forging of narratives of guilt and redemption, see Marcus Wood,Slavery, Empathy, and 
Pornography(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
30 On the range of journeys undertaken by black oceanic travellers in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, see Philip D. Morgan, ‘Black Experiences in Britain’s Maritime 
World’, in David Cannadine(ed.), Empire, the Sea and Global History: Britain’s Maritime 
World, c.1760-c.1840(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 105-33 
31 Eltis, Economic Growth, pp. 91, 100; see also Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave 
Trade, p. 84. 
32 F.L. Barnard,A Three Years Cruise in the Mozambique Channel [1848] (London: 
Dawsons, 1969), p. 232. 
33 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness(Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
34 Daget, ‘Suppression of the Illegal Trade’; Donald L. Canney, Africa Squadron: The US 
Navy and the Slave Trade(Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006). 
35 J.G. Beech, ‘The Marketing of Slavery Heritage in the United Kingdom.’ International 
Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Administration 2, 3/4 (2001), 85-105. 
36 Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Marcus Rediker(eds), Many Middle Passages: 
Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World(Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007); Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, pp. 290-91; Moses D.E. Nwulia, Britain and 
Slavery in East Africa(Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1975); AbdulSheriff, 
Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar(London: James Currey, 1987). Raymond C. Howell, 
The Royal Navy and the Slave Trade(Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1987). Gwyn 
Campbell(ed.), Abolition and its Aftermath in the Indian Ocean, Africa and Asia (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2005);Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade, pp. 55-85;John 
Wright, The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade(New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 
